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Constitutional Questions Regarding




Faced with an increase in broken families, a more mobile society, and
increased violence among children of all ages, legislatures have responded
with a wide range of statutes and programs designed to combat the perceived
decline in the family unit. An example of the lawmakers' response is the
promulgation of "grandparent visitation statutes."' However, questions have
arisen regarding the constitutionality of such statutes. This Note will discuss
the constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes in the context of
Herndon v. Tuhey,3 the recent decision upholding the Missouri grandparent
visitation statute. This Note will argue that the standard used by the Missouri
Supreme Court was improper and under the appropriate standard, the statute
is unconstitutional.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On November 24, 1982, Ann Tuhey gave birth to a son, Cody
Christopher.4 At the time of Cody's birth, Ann and her husband, Randy, had
been married almost a year,5 and lived in Marionville, Missouri as did Ann's
parents, Robert and Sara Hemdon.6
The Hemdons owned and operated Herndon's Orchard in Marionville?
For the first eight years of the Tuheys' marriage, Randy worked at Hemdon's
Orchard.8 During the final year and a half of Randy's employment the
relationship between Randy and his inlaws grew increasingly tumultuous.9
1. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
2. A grandparent visitation statute allows the grandparent to obtain court ordered
visitation, similar to visitation of a parent in a divorce situation.
3. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
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Randy believed that he received conflicting instructions from Mr. and Mrs.
Hemdon."0 Conversely, the Hemdons became dissatisfied with the quality
of Randy's work, although they never communicated this to Randy." In
February of 1990, Mrs. Hemdon informed Ann that Randy's services were no
longer desired. 2
Around this time, Ann and Randy's marriage soured." In May of 1990,
they separated and Ann filed for dissolution of the marriage. 4 During Ann
and Randy's separation, Ann retained primary custody of Cody, but Cody
frequently visited Randy. 5
In August of 1990, while Ann prepared Cody to visit his father, Cody
expressed a desire to Ann not to go. 6 Mrs. Herndon asked Ann to allow
Cody to visit with the Heradons instead of visiting Randy." Ann explained
the visitation plan to her mother and left to take Cody to Randy's for the
weekend.'" Later the same evening Ann went to her parents' home to pick
up Cody's bicycle, and Mrs. Hemdon again confronted Ann over the visit.'
A shouting match resulted, in which Mrs. Hemdon cursed Randy, and Ann
struck her mother.2" After hearing of the incident from his wife, Mr.
Hemdon decided to confront Randy. He and Mrs. Hemdon drove to Randy's
residence and entered his property uninvited.2' What resulted from the
engagement is unclear, but apparently Ann and Mrs. Heradon engaged in a
shoving match, while Mr. Hemdon and Randy brawled. The fray resulted in













22. Id. The opinion does not explain why the Hemdons went to Randy's home
or why, when they arrived, Ann was present.
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Prior to the debacle in August of 1990, the Hemdons maintained a close
relationship with Cody.' After August of 1990, Ann and Randy reconciled
and refused to allow any visitation between Cody and the Herndons.24
In February of 1991, the Hemdons filed suit seeking visitation with Cody
under Missouri's grandparents visitation statute.' The Tuheys' answer
challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the First and Fourteenth
23. Id. The Hemdons cared for Cody after school; Cody helped around the
orchard; Mrs. Hemdon took Cody to the public library and taught his Sunday school
class; and Mr. Hemdon coached Cody's basketball team. Id.
24. Id. at 205-06. Between the time of the August altercation and the filing of
the visitation action, the parties brought two other lawsuits against each other. The
Hemdons filed suit to recover $16,000 plus interest they had lent Ann and Randy. In
the loan suit, the Tuheys argued that, although the Hemdons were within their legal
rights, the Hemdons' true motivation stemmed from a desire to put pressure on Ann
and Randy. Sometime later Ann and Randy successfully prosecuted a small-claims
action for recovery of cattle used by the Hemdons for breeding purposes. Id.
25. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.402 (Supp. 1993) reads in relevant part:
1. The court may grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparents of
the child and issue any necessary orders to enforce the decree. The court
may grant grandparent visitation when:
(1) The parents of the child have filed for a dissolution of their
marriage. A grandparent shall have the right to intervene in any
dissolution action solely on the issue of visitation rights.
Grandparents shall also have the right to file a motion to modify
the original decree of dissolution to seek visitation rights when
such rights have been denied to them;
(2) One parent of the child is deceased and the surviving parent
denies reasonable visitation rights; or,
(3) A grandparent is unreasonably denied visitation with the
child for a period exceeding ninety days.
2. The court shall determine if the visitation by the grandparent would be
in the child's best interest or if itwould endanger the child's physicalhealth
or impair his emotional development. Visitationmay only be ordered when
the court finds such visitation to be in the best interest of the child. The
court may order reasonable conditions or restrictions on grandparent
visitation.
6. The right of a grandparent to seek or maintain visitation rights under
this section may terminate upon the adoption of the child except where the
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Amendments.26 The trial court found the statute constitutional and granted
the Hemdons visitation rights."
Three issues were presented on appeal: first, the constitutionality of the
statute under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; second, if the statute was
found to be constitutional, whether the visitation awarded by the trial court
was excessive; and, third, if the statute was found to be constitutional, whether
the trial court erred because evidence showed that the award of visitation was
not in the best interest of the child.28
The Missouri Supreme Court found Missouri's grandparent visitation
statute constitutional because it did not impose an undue burden on the family
relationship.29 The Court also found that the award of grandparent visitation
rights should not be "on par" with parental visitation or equal to the contact
prior to the refusal of visitation. Therefore, the Missouri Supreme Court
found the trial court's award of visitation excessive, and remanded for
reconsideration." Finally, the Court deferred to the trial court's finding that
an award of visitation to the Herndons was in Cody's best interest.31
26. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 206. The Tuheys also denied all material allegations.
Id.
27. Id. The specific terms of the visitation awarded by the trial court were:
From Nov. 16, 1992 to March of 1993: The first and third Saturday of each
month from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Id.
After March 1993: The first Saturday of eachmonth from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
and one over-night visitation on the third weekend of each month from 1:00 p.m.
Saturday until 6:00 p.m. Sunday. Id.
The trial court further ordered five hours of visitation on Thanksgiving or the
Sunday following it, at the Tuheys' option. At Christmas time, the court ordered
visitation from 5:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. on the twenty-third of December; further, the
court ordered an overnight stay sometime during Cody's Christmas vacation. Id.
During the summer, the Herdons got to visit Cody for one full week. Id. Finally,
the trial court ordered Ann and Randy to keep the Hemdons informed of all events
which a grandparent might reasonably attend. Id.
28. The Tuheys appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District,
which transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court because of the constitutional
issue. Herndon v. Tuhey, No. 17897, 1992 WL 206868 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 26,
1992).
29. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210.
30. Id. The trial court found this to be true in part because it would be more
likely to impose an undue burden on the parents' rights. Id. at 210-11.
31. Id. at 211. Chief Justice Covington and Judge Limbaugh dissented. Id.
[Vol. 60
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A. Substantive Due Process and the Parental
Right to Child Rearing
As originally perceived, the United States Constitution contained no
substantive due process element.32 However, in 1897, in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court decided that statutes must bear a
reasonable justification to a legitimate goal.33 Despite its lengthy history,
courts often approach substantive due process cases with extreme wariness."
Some commentators have argued for its abandonment altogether.3 5 However,
the doctrine exists today with considerable vitality. Substantive due process
applies only when state action infringes upon a life, liberty, or property
interest.3" The central issue in a substantive due process case is the level of
judicial review which the alleged deprivation receives.
Three standards of review exist to determine the constitutionality of a
state action under substantive due process. The first, strict scrutiny, applies
when the state action infringes upon the enjoyment of a fundamental right.3"
This level is the most difficult standard for the state action to survive.3 8 Only
a compelling governmental interest can justify the infringement upon a
32. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due ProcessAnalysis, 26 U.S.F.
L. REv. 625, 625 (1992).
33. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-91 (1897) (striking down a statute
banning out of state companies from selling marine insurance).
34. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions about Due Process,JudicialReview,
and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 309 (1993).
35. JoHN HART ELY, DEmOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980).
It is a bit embarrassing to suggest that a text is informative "when so many,
for so long, have found it to be only evocative," but there is simply no
avoiding the fact that the word that follows "due" is "process." No
evidence exists that "process" meant something different a century ago from
what it does now-in fact as I've indicated the historical record runs
somewhat the other way-and it should take more than occasional
aberrational use to establish that those who ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment had an eccentric definition in mind. Familiarity breeds
inattention, andwe apparentlyneedperiodic reminding that "substantive due
process" is a contradiction in terms-sort of like "green pastel redness."
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). See also ROBERT BoER, THE TEMPTrG
oF AmIcA: THE POLmcAL SEDUCTION OF TBE LAW 31-32 (1990).
36. Galloway, supra note 32, at 626.
37. Galloway, supra note 32, at 627.
38. Galloway, supra note 32, at 638.
1995]
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fundamental right.39 If the interest asserted is compelling, then the state
action must be narrowly tailored, or use the least restrictive means, to include
only those situations requiring protection." A fundamental right is defimed
as "those liberties that are deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."41 Strict scrutiny does not require an outright ban for the state
action to infringe upon a fundamental. right. Indeed, seemingly mild
inconveniences have constituted an infringement under substantive due
process.42
The weakest standard of review is "rational basis review." The state
action will be upheld if it bears a reasonable relation to a justifiable state
interest.43 Rational basis review is used in two situations. The first situation
is where no fimdamental right is involved. Alternatively, if the court finds the
alleged state action does not infringe upon the fundamental right, then the
claim receives rational basis review.44 At this level, the state action will
almost always survive because the claimant in the suit must prove that the
state action is irrational for any valid governmental interest."
Until 1992 only those two levels of review existed. Then in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,46 the United States Supreme Court developed a middle
standard, undue burden, to apply to substantive due process cases concerning
abortion.47 In Casey, a plurality of the Supreme Court determined that in
order for an abortion statute to be struck down as unconstitutional, the state
action must place an "undue burden" on the abortion right.4" If the state
action places an undue burden on abortion it will be found unconstitutional
unless justified by a compelling interest.4 ' The plurality selected its standard
to allow more infringement by the state action on a fundamental right than
strict scrutiny, but to allow less infringement than allowed by rational basis
review.50 The Casey plurality noted that the uniqueness of the abortion
act,5" the state's heavy interest in potential life, 2 and the issue of body
39. Galloway, supra note 32, at 638.
40. Galloway, supra note 32, at 638.
41. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
42. Id. at 687; see also Galloway, supra note 32.
43. Galloway, supra note 32, at 643.
44. Galloway, supra note 32, at 637.
45. Galloway, supra note 32, at 628.
46. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2818.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2818-19.
51. Id. at 2807.
52. Id. at 2817.
[Vol. 60
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autonomy, 3 all created a need for a new, less exacting method of analysis for
abortion cases. The Court never indicated that this standard should be adopted
for other issues arising under substantive due process. Rather, the Court
seemed to specifically limit the standard to abortion cases.54
The constitutional analysis for grandparentvisitation proceeds as follows:
First, does grandparent visitation infringe upon a liberty interest? Second, if
so, what standard of review will the statute receive? Finally, will the state's
justification for such infiingement satisfy the standard of review? The liberty
interest allegedly infringed upon by grandparent visitation is the parents' child
rearing right," because it is the parents' decision whether the child will visit
the child's grandparents. This much appears to be settled; the rest of the
analysis is the subject of this Note.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,56 the U.S. Supreme Court announced that the
liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment included the rights of parents to
raise their children.5" In Meyer, the state convicted Robert Meyer under a
statute that forbade the teaching of a foreign language to any student who had
not passed the eighth grade." The Court struck down the statute as
infringing upon the parents' fundamental right to child rearing. 9 The
Constitution, the Court stated, prevented "legislative action which is arbitrary
or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
state to effect."'6 Despite this language, which seems to indicate rational
basis review, the Court appeared to use a higher level of review and explicitly
declared the child rearing right fundamental.61 The Court declared, "[t]hat
the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality
of its citizens, physically, mentally, and morally is clear; but the individual
has certain fundamental rights which must be respected."62 This language
53. Id. at 2810.
54. Id. at 2819. The plurality stated, "[only where state regulation imposes an
undue burden on a woman's ability to make [the abortion] decision does the power of
the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Id.
55. As used in this Note, the fundamental child rearing right involves the right
of the parents to raise their children. The raising of children necessarily includes the
right to make decisions for their children which impact upon the child's life and well-
being.
56. 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
57. Id. at 399.
58. Id. at 396.
59. Id. at 403.
60. Id. at 399-400.
61. Id. at 401. It should be further recognized that this case comes prior to the
development of two-tiered review in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938).
62. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (emphasis added).
1995]
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implies that the rational relation test was not used. If rational basis review
had been used, then analysis would have focused on whether the statute
rationally improves the physical, mental, or moral well being of its citizens,
not whether it properly respected a fundamental right of an individual.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,63 two years later, the Court reaffirmed the
child rearing right as fundamental.' In Pierce, two private schools sought
injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of an Oregon statute requiring parents
to send their children to public schools.65 Plaintiffs asserted that by doing
so the statute infringed upon the child rearing rights of the parents by limiting
the parents choice of education for their children and therefore violated the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." The Court
agreed and found the statute unconstitutional.67
The doctrine of substantive due process underwent a major shift in focus
in the late 1930s and early 1940s.' In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,69 the
Court began the demise of "economic substantive due process."7 The
following year, in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products,1 the
Court developed the modem two-tiered level of review for substantive due
process analysis. 2 In footnote four, the Court indicated that there may be
a higher standard of review for those rights falling within the first ten
amendments, legislation that interferes with democratic processes, and
legislation that interferes with minorities.73 The Supreme Court specifically
mentioned Pierce and Meyer as types of cases that might receive such
treatment. 4 The analysis of footnote four led the Supreme Court to adopt
two separate tiers of review, namely strict scrutiny and rational basis. 5 The
63. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
64. Id. at 534-35.
65. Id. at 531.
66. Id. at 532.
67. Id. at 534-35.
68. GEOFFERY R. STONE ET AL., CoNsTrTUToNAL LAw 806-11 (2d ed. 1991).
69. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
70. STONE, supra note 68, at 806-07. "Economic substantive due process" dealt
with the constitutionality of state imposed economic regulation. Id. at 807. See also
id. at 786-814.
71. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The Court cited these cases as examples different from the child-rearing
right. The Court cited Pierce as an example of a statute affecting religion and Meyer
as an example of a statute affecting minorities. Id.
75. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942).
[Vol. 60
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structure remained unchanged until 1992 when the Supreme Court decided
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.76
After Carolene Products, the parental child rearing right joined the upper
tier of the two-tiered review, subjecting any state action infringing on it to
strict scrutiny review.7 However, this did not mean that parents possessed
free reign in the upbringing of their children. In Prince v. Massachusetts,"8
the Court upheld a child labor law in the face of constitutional attack for
violating freedom of religion and the child rearing right. 9 The Court,
however, upheld the status of the parental child rearing right as fundamental
stating:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder.... And it is in recognition of this that these
decisions have respected the private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter.80
The Court recognized that the state as parens patriae81 has a compelling
interest in the safety of the child and, when necessary, to prevent a major
negative impact upon society, promotion of the child's welfare." For
example, the state possesses an interest in promoting the child's welfare by
enforcing mandatory education for children in order to prevent the growth of
an uneducated electorate and work force. The state's interest in promoting the
child's safety allows the state to enact child labor laws, and to require
vaccinations.' After Prince, in order for a state to retain a statute that
impinges upon the child rearing right of parents, the statute must present a
safety interest or a promotional interest in the child's welfare that only the
specific state action can protect. Further, in order to survive strict scrutiny
analysis, the statute must be narrowly tailored in order to include only those
instances in which the state's interest is present.
76. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). See also supranotes 46-54 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
78. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
79. Id. at 170.
80. Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
81. Parens patriae-literally "parent of the country"-refers traditionally to the
role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as
juveniles or the insane. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
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The parental child rearing right was reexamined in Wisconsin v. Yoder."
In Yoder, Wisconsin convicted Amish parents for violating a state compulsory
education law. 5 The Amish parents feared that education beyond the eighth
grade subjected the child to worldly influences. The Amish parents wished
to insulate their children from these worldly influences as part of the child's
religious upbringing. The parents claimed that the statute, as applied to them,
violated their right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court
struck down the convictions on the basis that the right of parents to control the
child's religious upbringing outweighs the state's interest in education of the
children up to the age of sixteen.86 Wisconsin asserted that its parens patriae
power entitled it to save a child from his or her parents' poor decision
regarding the child's future and that a general failure to educate would result
in significant social costsY The Court concluded that based on the Amish
history of productivity, no significant social burden would result from removal
of Amish children from school, and the Amish parents should make the
decision, rather than the state."
Yoder's characterization of the competing interests is illuminating. The
Court declared the state's interest in education to "rank[ ] at the very apex of
the function of a state."'89 Concerning the parental right at issue, the Court
stated that "[t]he history and culture of Western Civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."9 Finally, the
Court allowed the parental child rearing right to be limited when "it appears
that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child or have
84. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
85. Id. at 207.
86. Id. at 234.
87. Id. at 232.
88. Id. at 233-34. It could be argued that Yoder rests almost exclusively on the
right of freedom of religion. However, at least one Supreme Court freedom of religion
case specifically rejects this argument. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882
n.1 (1990). Justice Scalia, speaking for the majority wrote:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such
as . . . the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters ... to direct the education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder
Id.
89. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.
90. Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 60
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a potential for significant social burdens."91 The Court in Yoder, therefore,
reaffirmed the status of the parental child rearing right as a fundamental right
which could be limited only to protect the health or safety of the child, or to
prevent significant social burdens.
In 1977, the Court struck down a zoning ordinance that forbade a
grandmother from living with her son and two grandsons, who were cousins
rather than brothers.' Prior to Moore v. City of East Cleveland,93 the
Court, under the rational basis standard of review, upheld a zoning ordinance
that prohibited non-biologically related persons from occupying the same
household.94 In Moore, the Supreme Court decided, for the first time, a
substantive due process case where the parental child rearing right stood alone,
without any other constitutional rights at issue to reinforce it.95 Since only
two standards of review existed, in order for the ordinance to be struck down
the parental child rearing right must have been considered a fundamental right
worthy of the higher level of review.
While at the time the Supreme Court decidedMoore it had not articulated
an intermediate level of review, some commentators argue that the standard
of review used in Moore could be considered a level of intermediate
scrutiny.96 Because the plurality in Moore never expressly rejected strict
scrutiny,' the Court likely applied a strict scrutiny analysis without expressly
employing the strict scrutiny rhetoric. Further, the plurality expressly cited the
survival and reaffirmance of Pierce and Meyer.9" Therefore, the Court
maintained the parental child rearing right as a fundamental right.99
91. Id. at 233-34.
92. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495 (1977).
93. Id.
94. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974).
95. Arguably, the First Amendment right to freedom of associationwas at issue
in Moore; however, the plurality never addressed this issue. Justice Stewart, in his
dissent, discussed the issue, but rejected it on the basis that the asserted right did not
relate to "the promotion of speech, assembly, the press, or religion." Moore, 431 U.S.
at 535-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 499. The Court stated, "when the government intrudes on choices
concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the
importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are
served by the challenged regulation." Id. See also Galloway, supra note 32, at 643
(arguing that this language suggests a form of intermediate review).
97. See Galloway, supra note 32, at 643.
98. Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 n.8.
99. It has been argued that Moore stands for the right to define one's family
without interference from the government. Judith L. Shandling, Note, The
Constitutional Constraints of Grandparents Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
118, 128-29 (1986). Those who interpret Moore this way argue that the grandmother
1995]
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In support of using a rational basis review, state courts often cite
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur.00 However, LaFleur dealt with
the fundamental right of choosing to bear a child.' In LaFleur, two
pregnant junior high teachers challenged the constitutionality of a regulation
requiring them to take maternity leave after five months of pregnancy and to
wait three months after giving birth to return to work."° The real issue in
LaFleur was the effect of the forced maternity leave upon the decision
whether to bear a child.13 The procreation right is a fundamental right
separate from the parental child rearing right. While the Court did not explain
its use of rational basis review, T'0 the fundamental rights of procreation and
child rearing are different. Therefore, the case should not stand as precedent
for use of the rational review standard to parental child rearing rights.
B. Grandparent Visitation and State Law
The common law granted grandparents no visitation rights, only a moral
obligation forced parents to allow grandparent visitation.' In response to
inMoore acted as a parent when her grandchildren came to live with her, and that the
state cannot restrict her ability to define her family. Id. at 129. This right, it is
argued, is distinct from the right of the parent to make decisions about the child's life.
Id. at 127 n.51.
This distinctionwould seem only partially correct. The family definitional right
is inherently part of the child rearing right. If the family definitional right in Moore
is different from the child-rearing right asserted elsewhere, then the very concept limits
itself to a definition of family as only biological relations, excluding foster families,
common law marriages, and unadopted children raised by guardians. For example,
Shandling would allow state infringement, through grandparent visitation, on two
parents who have adopted a child, but refuse to allow it in an intact biological family.
Id. at 137. The distinction assumes that for some unstated reason an adoptive parent
lacks the ability to define his or her family. A parent-child relationship should not be
defined solely upon biological grounds, but rather it should be defined by determining
the primary caregivers of the child. Instead, Moore stands for the proposition that the
right to define one's family is part of parental child-rearing and those who take on the
responsibility of child rearing gain the constitutional protection that comes with it.
100. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). See, e.g., Sibley v. Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 1052
(N.Y. 1981).
101. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639 (finding overly restrictive maternity leave by a
school district may infringe on the fundamental right to bear a child).
102. Id. at 634.
103. Id. at 640.
104. Possibly the Court felt that the requirement did not infringe upon the
procreation right and, therefore, did not trigger a strict scrutiny analysis.
105. See Ward v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063, 1069 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1987); King v.
[Vol. 60
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/9
GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS
high divorce rates and increased mobility of society, as of May 1994, all fifty
states had enacted some type of grandparent visitation rights statute."'
Originally, these statutes attempted to maintain an already existing relationship
between grandchild and grandparent upon divorce or death of the
grandparents' child. 7 In recent years, however, the trend is for statutes that
grant visitation with intact families and to allow the creation of a relationship
between the grandchild and grandparent.0
King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 378 (1992); L.F.M v.
Department of Social Servs., 507 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986);
Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199, 200 (N.J. 1975); In re Whitaker, 522 N.E.2d 563,
566 (Ohio 1988); Grover v. Phillips, 681 P.2d 81, 83 (Okla. 1984); In the Matter of
Adoption of R.D.S., 787 P.2d 968, 969 (Wyo. 1990).
106. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-10a-30, 30-3-5 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.4.250
(1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-337, 25-337.01 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-13-103 (1993); CAL. FAM. LAW CODE §§ 3103, 3104 (West 1994); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 19-1-117 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1986);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01 (West 1995); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (Harrison 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1992); IDAHO
CODE § 32-1008 (1993) (repealed as of July 1, 1994); 750 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN.
§ 5/607 (Smith/Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7.2 (Bums 1993); IOWA CODE
§ 598.35 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-129, 38-130, 60-1616 (1986 & Supp.
1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:344 (West 1994); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 136 (West 1994); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1001-1004 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 9-102
(1993); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 39D (West 1993); MIcH. COM. LAWs
ANN. § 722.27b (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1994); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 93-16-1, 93-16-3 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (Supp. 1993); MONTr.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-9-101 to 40-9-102 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-1802 (1988);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 125A-330 (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1992); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Miohie 1993); N.Y.
DoM. REL. LA w § 72 (McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1987); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.051 (Anderson
1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 5 (West 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1993);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 5311 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 15-5-24.3 (1993); S.C. CODE
ANN. 20-7-420 (Law. Co-op. 1993); S.D. CODIFID LAws ANN. §§ 25-4-52, 25-4-54
(1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (1991) (found unconstitutional under the state
constitutioninHawkv. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993)); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.03 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN § 30-5-2 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15
§§ 1101, 1102 (1993); VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-107.2 (West 1993); WAsH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 26.09240 (West 1994); W. VA. CODE § 767.245 (West 1981); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 767.245 (West 1981); WYo. STAT. §§ 20-2-101, 20-2-113 (1989).
107. Edward M. Bums, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Is it Time for the
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State grandparent visitation statutes vary widely in effect and
requirements, but they can be organized into three classes: first, statutes
requiring death, divorce, or loss of parental rights;... second, statutes
allowing visitation regardless of the grandchild's nuclear family situation;"'
and third, statutes allowing visitation regardless of the grandchild's nuclear
family situation if a substantial relationship existed prior to the denial of
visitation by the parents."' Some states have gone as far as to allow
109. See ALAsKA STAr. § 25.4.250 (1993); AiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-337,
25-337.01 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1993); CAL. FAM. LAW CODE
§§ 3103, 3104 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 752.01 (West 1993); GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-7-3 (Harrison 1993); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 571-46 (1992); 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/607 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-1-11.7.2 (Bums 1993); IOWA CODE § 598.35 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 38-129, 38-130, 60-1616 (1986 & Supp. 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:344
(West 1994); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 136 (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, §§ 1001-1004 (West 1993); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 119, § 39D (West 1993);
MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.27b (West 1993); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West
1994); MisS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-16-1, 93-16-3 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802
(1988); Nav. REv. STAT. § 125A-330 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d
(1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie
1993); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (MoKinney 1994) (as interpreted in Emanuel S. v.
Joseph E. 560 N.Y.S.2d 211, 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.051 (Anderson 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit., 23 § 5311 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAw
§§ 15-5-24.3 (1993); Tx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (West 1994); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §§ 1101, 1102 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (1993); W. VA. CODE
§ 767.245 (1981); WYo. STAT. §§ 20-2-101 (1993), 20-2-113 (1989).
110. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-10a-30, 30-3-5 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 32-1008
(1993) (repealed as of July 1, 1994); Ky. Rpv. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 9-102 (1993); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 452.402 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-9-101 to 40-9-102 (1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993); N.C. Gm. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1987); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. Tit. 10, § 5 (West 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN.
20-7-420 (Law. Co-op. 1993); S.D. CODFuD LAvs ANN. §§ 25-4-52, 25-4-54 (1992);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (1991) (found unconstitutional under the Tennessee
State Constitution in Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993)); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-5-2 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1981).
111. See CAL. FAM. LAw CODE §§ 3103, 3104 (West 1994); IDAHO CODE
§ 32-1008 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1994); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 93-16-1, 93-16-3 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802 (1988); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-9-2 (Michie 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 5311 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-5-24.3 (1993); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (1994); W. VA. CODE § 767.245
(West 1981); WYo. STAT. §§ 20-2-101 (1993), 20-2-113 (1989).
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visitation by any person regardless of whether the person is a biological
relation."
2
Several state statutes have been subject to constitutional attack as
violating the child rearing right. One state court declared the statute
constitutional after only a single paragraph discussion.' Several states
considered the constitutionality of the state's grandparent visitation statute
after first declaring that the issue was not properly before the court."'
Unfortunately, the situation often arises where the constitutional question has
not been reserved for review." 5
In deciding the constitutionality of such statutes, most state courts use a
rational basis review. 6 Cases using rational basis review generally rely on
Pierce, Meyer, and LaFleur."7 The meaningfl portions of the state
decisions on grandparentvisitation are interests asserted to support the statute.
Under rational basis review, the state's interest need not be compelling,
however the interests asserted in support of the statute provide an insightful
look into the potential justifications set forth by the states. Two common
justifications exist, and can be shown by a discussion of state decisions from
New York and Kentucky.
The Court of Appeals in New York ruled on the constitutionality of New
York's statute in Sibley v. Sheppard."' The paternal grandparents of Willie
Sheppard, the child in Sibley, adopted him after the death of Willie's
mother.' The court found the paternal grandparents, despite having
adopted W'illie, stood in an equal legal position as the natural parents would
have as against a maternal grandparent when asserting the parental child
rearing right.12 ' The court used a rational basis test to determine that
"[p]ermitting grandparent visitation over the adoptive parents' objection does
112. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, §§ 1001-1004 (West 1993); WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (1994).
113. Cockrell v. Sittason, 500 So. 2d 1119, 1121 (Ala. 1986).
114. See, e.g., Lehrer v. Davis, 571 A.2d 691, 692 (Conn. 1990); Spradling v.
Harris, 778 P.2d 365, 366-67 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
115. See, e.g., Hilly. Divechio, 625 A.2d 642, 644 (1993); AlisonD. v. Virginia
M. 552 N.Y.S.2d 321, 324 (1990).
116. See, e.g., King, 828 S.W.2d at 632; Sibley, 429 N.E.2d at 1052; Bailey v.
Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015, 1019-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Sketo v. Brown, 559 So.
2d 381 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
117. E.g., King, 828 S.W.2d at 631; Sibley, 429 N.E.2d at 1052.
118. 429 N.E.2d 1049 (N.Y. 1981).
119. Id. at 323.
120. Id. at 327 (citing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,
843 n.49, 844 n.51 (1977)).
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not unconstitutionally impinge upon the integrity of the adoptive family." '
The court based its decision in part on the state's role in the adoption
process." It further found that "[p]rotecting the best interest of the child
is unquestionably a proper exercise of the police power.""2
More recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld Kentucky's
grandparent visitation statute from attack on constitutional grounds, in King
v. King.' Both King and Herndon dealt with visitation upon an intact
nuclear family that had become estranged from the grandparents. The King
court declared a fundamental right for grandparents to visit their
grandchildren exists.1' The court made this bold statement without citing
any authority or offering any explanation." 6 Without expressly stating so,
the court used a rational basis test to determine constitutionality."2
The Supreme Court of Kentucky differed from the New York Court of
Appeals in its analysis of the specific police power which justified the statute.
Rather than relying on the protection of the best interest of the child, the
Kentucky Court found the "strengthening of family bonds" to be the
justification behind the statute."2 The distinction is important because in a
situation where an intact family is forced to accept court ordered grandparent
visitation, the state, under the New York court's analysis, is protecting the
child from the parents' decision regarding with whom the child may associate.
However, under the Kentucky court's analysis, the state is acting to strengthen
the bond between the grandparent and the child, despite the parents'
objections.
The Tennessee Supreme Court struck down that state's grandparent
visitation statute under the state constitution.2 9  In Hawk v. Hawk,'" the
Tennessee Supreme Court confronted court ordered grandparent visitation
upon an intact family. The court rejected a call that the best interest of the
child formed a compelling state interest that would validate the use of the
121. Id. at 327.
122. Id. ("The adoptive relationship, however, is solely the creature of statute,
unknown to the common law.").
123. Id. at 329.
124. 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 378 (1992).
125. Id. at 632 ("This statute seeks to balance the fundamental rights of the
parents, grandparents, and the child.").
126. Id.
127. Id. ("[lt is not unreasonable for the General Assembly to attempt to
strengthen familial bonds.").
128. Id.
129. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn. 1993).
130. 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
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parens patriae power to impose visitation. 3' The court decided that, absent
harm to the child by denying visitation, the child's best interests did not
constitute a sufficient state interest to uphold the statute under the state
constitution.'32
Although holding the statute unconstitutional under the state constitution,
the court cited Pierce, Meyer, Prince, Yoder, and Moore as examples of the
child rearing right and the U.S. Supreme Court's deep concern for that
right.'33 In dicta, the Tennessee court indicated that it considered the federal
cases to prescribe the same result.'
C. Missouri's Grandparent Visitation Statute
The original Missouri statute allowed visitation only upon the death of
the grandparents' child. 5 In 1988, the legislature amended the statute and,
by including subsection 1(3), covered an intact family unit within the statute's
purview. 36 The legislative history of the current statute indicates that the
legislature intended the statute to include visitation between an intact family
and estranged grandparents. 1
37
The original statute withstood constitutional attack in Barry v.
Barrale.13  in Barry, the paternal grandparents brought suit seeking
visitation against the grandchild's mother and stepfather after their son, the
child's father, died."" The court never stated its standard of review, but
found only that the best interests of the child was a valid state interest and
upheld the grandparent visitation statute.'
131. Id. at 579. The analysis of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in this way
mirrors the reasoning of similar cases on the federal level, regarding the child-rearing
right. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34.
132. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 582.
133. Id. at 578-79.
134. Id. at 580.
135. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (1978) (superseded).
136. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (Supp. 1993). Subsection 1(3) reads: "A
grandparent is unreasonably denied visitation with the child for a period exceeding
ninety days." Mo. REv. STAT. § 542.402 1(3) (Supp. 1993).
137. Brief for Respondent at 26, Hemdonv. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993)
(No. 17897-2) (citing MISSOURI HOUSE OF REPRESENTATV INTERIM COMMrrME ON
CHILDREN, YOUTH FAMIrIms, REPORT TO THE SPEAKER ON CHILD CUSTODY,
VISITATION, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AND DIVORCE MEDIATION 22 (1987)).
138. 598 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). Herndon represents the only attack
upon the 1988 statute on constitutional grounds.
139. Id. at 576.
140. Id. at 581.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Judge Thomas's Majority Opinion
In Herndon v. Tuhey,'41 the court upheld the constitutionality of section
452.402 finding that the statute did not impose an undue burden on the
fundamental right of child rearing. 42
The court launched its discussion by stating the presumption that the
statute was constitutional and that all doubts about the constitutionality must
be resolved in the statute's favor.143 Next, the court recognized the child
rearing right and acknowledged its vitality under the Due Process Clause. 44
The state, however, can regulate the fundamental right for the well-being of
the child.14 Finally, the court focused on the crux of its analysis; the level
of infringement necessary to find the statute unconstitutional, under the child
rearing right. In order for a statute to be struck down as unconstitutional the
statute must impose an obstacle to enjoyment of the right. 46 The court
found the statute posed, in no way, an infringement that equaled those that had
violated the constitution in the past. 47 Judge Thomas's opinion found the
traditional role of the grandparents in raising the grandchildren reduced the
level of infringement on the family rights. 8
The King case from Kentucky closely paralleled the facts of Herndon,
and the Missouri court adopted King's policy reasoning that the grandchild
will benefit from contact with a fit grandparent.149  Further, the
grandparent's loneliness is eased by contact with the child.' The need for
a parental action that threatened "substantial harm to the children" in order to
141. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
142. Id. at 208.
143. Id. at 207.
144. Id. (citing Moore v.City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)).
145. Id. The court cited Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) for this
proposition. Ginsberg dealt with the propriety of a conviction for sale of obscene
materials to a minor. Id. at 631. While the U.S. Supreme Court cited Meyer, Pierce,
and Prince, the case did not involve a parental decision in conflict with a state statute.
Id. at 637-41. Indeed the Court admitted that a parent of a minor child could buy the
obscene material and give it to the child without punishment. Id. at 637-39.
146. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 208 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375
(1978)).
147. Id. at 209. The court cited as examples Meyer, Pierce, Yoder, and Prince
among others. Id.
148. Id.
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justify the intrusion of the statute did not exist unless the infringement
imposed by the statute was substantial.'
The statute survived constitutional attack because it did not impose an
undue burden, was narrowly tailored to protect the interest of all parties, and,
if visitation was not in the best interest of the child or would endanger the
child's well being, the grandparents are denied visitation.'52 Finally, judicial
oversight protected the child rearing right from an undue burden.'53
B. Chief Justice Covington's Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Covington, joined by Judge Limbaugh, dissented from the
majority. Chief Justice Covington considered the majority's decision to rest,
not on constitutional analysis, but on the discretion of the trial court.54
Therefore, the greater the amount of visitation awarded, the closer to
unconstitutional the award becomes.'55 Chief Justice Covington determined
that since the child rearing right is fundamental, and restrictions on
fundamental rights receive strict scrutiny analysis, the proper standard for
review was strict scrutiny.56 In order to satisfy strict scrutiny least
restrictive means and a compelling governmental interest were necessary.'57
Chief Justice Covington did not determine the constitutionality of the
statute under strict scrutiny.' Generally, however for a statute infringing
on the child rearing right to survive a strict scrutiny analysis the state must
show some harm to the child.'59 The Chief Justice stated, "It is without
cavil that most children will benefit from a relationship with grandparents.
Before a family decision with respect to child rearing is intruded upon,
however, the legislature should, at minimum, require a showing of harm to the
child in the absence of visitation."'" Standing alone, Chief Justice




153. Id. The court also found that the visitation granted was unreasonable
because the grandparents and parents rights to visitation should not be considered
equal. Id.
154. Id. at 211 (Covington, C.J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. See supranotes 38-39 and accompanying text.
158. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 211 (Covington, C.J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 212 (Covington, C.J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 211 (Covington, C.I., dissenting).
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Chief Justice Covington next argued that even if the undue burden test
adopted by the majority is applied, the alleged infringement was greater than
the majority recognized."
V. COMMENT
A. The Flaws of the Undue Burden Standard
The Herndon decision represents a significant shift in analysis from prior
Missouri case law in the field of substantive due process. Prior to Herndon's
application of the Casey undue burden standard to areas outside of abortion
and after establishing the presence of a fundamental right, the court's analysis
centered upon the level of the interest the state sought to protect by its
action.1 After Herndon, a Missouri court can uphold state actions on
constitutional grounds, which admittedly encroach significantly, but not
unduly, upon a fundamental right. An individual trial judge's discretion now
determines, to an even greater extent than in pre-Herndon cases, the
constitutionality of a state action by determining, without any ready
touchstone, the amount of infringement which the constitution tolerates upon
an individual right."M
The tolerance of a higher level of infringement creates a gray area of
infringement, but not undue burden infringement. Such a gray area allows
greater government intrusion upon a constitutional right, resulting in a
devaluation of the constitutional right. Constitutionally speaking, gray areas
act only to interfere with the overall general exercise of liberties, by allowing
the creation of an intrusive government, through imposition of state regulation
upon family decisions.
Because the trial court determines visitation and under the undue burden
standard the constitutional issue turns on the amount of visitation, the trial
court essentially construes the Constitution each time it is presented with a
grandparents visitation case.'65 Because of this constitutional gray area, the
potential exists for widely divergent visitation upon similar factual situations;
resulting in differing applications of the Constitution among individuals. For
example, a court in Kansas City may decide that visitation of once a month
meets the constitutional standard, while a court in St. Louis may decide that
the same visitation causes an undue burden on the parents' child rearing right.
162. Id. at 212 (Covington, C.J., dissenting).
163. See Galloway, supra note 32, at 639. Even under strict scrutiny, courts
confronted the level of infringement uponthe asserted fundamental right; but the lower
threshold made it an easier hurdle to overcome.
164. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 211 (Covington, C.J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 210-11.
[Vol. 60
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/9
GRANDPARENT VISITATON RIGHTS
Potentially, a trial court could determine that any level of visitation violates
the Fourteenth Amendment and refuse to grant visitation. The Constitution
must be applied as equally as possible without the spawning of vast numbers
of differing constitutional interpretations among jurisdictions.166
Furthermore, when the undue burden standard unites with the
presumption of constitutionality, which mandates that all doubts to be resolved
in favor of constitutionality, the resulting combination creates an arduous, if
not impossible, task for the plaintiff in a substantive due process case. Unless
the infringement on a fundamental right exists so clearly as to remove all
doubt, the statute will be found constitutional because any doubts remaining
in the court's mind will force the presumption of constitutionality. Thus, it
appears that only outright bans, or something close to an outright ban, would
be necessary to satisfy the undue burden standard.
The effects of the combination of the undue burden standard and the
presumption of constitutionality is bolstered by the Court's analysis of
Pennsylvania's abortion law at issue in Casey. The Court upheld the medical
emergency portion of the statute despite the arguably serious health
consequences to the mother in some cases. 67 However, the Court went on
to strike down the spousal notification portion of the same statue because a
"significant number of women.., are likely to be deterred from procuring an
abortion... "'s This language would seem to indicate that something close
to an outright ban is necessaryto violate the undue burden standard. Outside
of the abortion area the United States Supreme Court's decisions do not
support the need for an outright ban in order to infringe upon a fundamental
right.
169
Even if the standard used in Herndon is correct, the court severely
misjudged the amount of infringement. 70 The court's comparison of levels
of infringement in prior cases misses a fundamental point. In Pierce, Meyer,
Prince, Yoder, and Moore, the state did not force a non-nuclear family
member upon an unwilling nuclear family.' 1  Constitutionally
countenancing such an act allows the state to usurp a parental decision
regarding children without a need to protect the health or prevent a severe
166. Martinv. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816).
167. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2822 (1992). The provision
in question granted immediate abortions onlywhen the abortionwas necessaryto avert
death or serious risk of injury to the mother. The District Court had found that three
serious conditions would not be covered under this formula and struck down the law.
The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court reversed. Id.
168. Id. at 2829.
169. See Galloway supra note 32 at 637.
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negative impact upon society. Indeed, in Moore the state violated the
Constitution when it attempted to forbid a type of contact between willing
non-nuclear family members. If the state can not forbid such contact, why
should it be allowed to require it? The business of inter-family relations is a
realm which the courts and legislatures should only ingress upon to protect
health, or safety interest of the child, or to prevent the child from becoming
severe burden upon society.
72
Numerous problems exist in applying the undue burden standard to allow
grandparent visitation. 3 Can the grandparents be prevented from taking the
grandchild to their worship services if the parents object? Must the parents
take the grandchild to the grandparents if the grandparent(s), due to age, are
unable to drive? Will the grandparents have the right to discipline the child
as they see fit during their visitation? Wil a teenage grandchild be forced to
visit the grandparent if the grandchild does not wish to? Will the child's
curfew and other parental rules be enforce by the grandparents or will the
grandparents be allowed to create their own rules? Must the parents and
grandparents agree not to speak ill of the other while in the presence of the
grandchild? These issue would not be addressed in a parental visitation case,
since parents would have equal rights in raising the child.
The questions left unanswered by the statute and the Herndon decision
point out that the "occasionaltemporary visitation contemplated by the statute"
creates an undue burden, and warrants finding the statute unconstitutional even
under the undue burden standard, because the various state interests asserted
do not form a compelling interest.
B. The Correct Standard
As Chief Justice Covington correctly contends,"' the parental child
rearing right merits strict scrutiny analysis. Under strict scrutiny, the statute
infringes enough to require an analysis of the state's asserted interest.
Two state interests have been asserted in the past to justify grandparent
visitation statutes: protecting the best interest of the child,"75 and
strengthening of family ties.'76 Only those state interests which protect the
health of the child, or a safety interest of the child, or seek to avoid significant
172. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
173. Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Grandparent Refuse?,
24 J. FAM. L. 393 (1986).
174. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 211 (Covington, C.J., dissenting).
175. See Sibley v. Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (N.Y. 1981).
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social costs later in the child's life comprise a compelling governmental
interest.
In protecting the best interest of the child, the state interest is validated
by contending that the child will be harmed by the absence of a grandchild-
grandparent relationship. 1  Arguably, this is true. However, an equally
valid argument can be made that the child could potentially suffer from forced
visitation in an intact family, because it forces the child into the midst of the
conflict and tension between the parents and the grandparents."' It is
unclear, therefore, whether the absence of a grandparent-grandchild
relationship is genuinely damaging to the child, and unless legislatures validly
assume courts are better decision makers than parents in this regard, the statute
prevents parents from raising their children as they see fit. If the legislature
is correct that the grandparent will be harmed by the absence of the
grandparent-grandchildrelationship, then the statute must be limited to correct
only such situations. Limitations within the statute could be implemented
which would tailor it to satisfy the constitutional requirements. The state
could require a finding of harm by the absence of the grandparent-grandchild
relationship, or presume that parents, with the natural love for their children,
act in what they perceive to be that child's best interest." 9
Further, the protecting best interest of the child argument, if accepted,
opens the door for the legislature to enact similarly wide-reaching statutes in
a myriad of areas. All children would certainly benefit from living with a
wealthier family, if the family was equally as loving; however, moving
children around in this manner would raise serious constitutional
questions."' 0 Furthermore, children would benefit from eliminating junk
food from their diet, however, can the state regulate what a parent allows their
child to eat? The best interest standard fails to meet the compelling
government interest test under strict scrutiny analysis and, therefore, a statute
justified by it should be rendered unconstitutional.
The strengthening of family relations offers no greater compelling
interest. The failure of the family to get along does not endanger the child's
safety or health, or pose enough of risk that the child will become a societal
burden to allow the legislature to trample upon the parents' child rearing right.
177. See, e.g., Mimkonv. Ford, 332 A.2d 199, 205 (N.J. 1975); In re Whitaker,
522 N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ohio 1988).
178. Deweesev. Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975), overruled
on other grounds by Cheme Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes 763 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1989).
179. The second approach is the one taken by the California and Rhode Island
Legislatures in their grandparent visitation statutes. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3103,
3104 (West 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 15-5-24.3 (1993). See also Deweese, 520
S.W.2d at 526; King, 828 S.W.2d at 637 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
180. King, 828 S.W.2d at 634 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
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However, even if it does form a compelling interest, the state must narrow the
statute to cover only those situations where the strengthening of family
relations is necessary. This could be achieved by requiring a strong
relationship between grandchild and grandparent prior to the denial of
visitation.1
81
It is important to note the difference here between the intact family and
one which is divided by death or divorce. In an intact family, both parents
have made a decision regarding with whom their child can associate. This
decision cannot be attacked as dividing the parents' nuclear family from the
grandparents' nuclear family, since one parent is a member of each nuclear
family, and has made a decision to prevent the child from visiting those
grandparents." The interest of the parent in maintaining the relationship
with his or her parents is at least as strong as the desire of the grandparents
to see their grandchild. If the parents decide to end the relationship with the
grandparents, the state should not elevate the grandparents' interest over the
constitutional rights of the parents.
In the divided family, the interest of the custodial or surviving parent to
maintain a family relationship with the grandparents of the former or deceased
spouse's family is limited or not present. The grandparents cannot rely on
their child's concern for them to allow access to the grandchild. A deceased
parent cannot take the child to visit the child's grandparents, and the divorced
parent may, due to time or distance problems, be unable to secure such
visitation. In this situation the grandparents step into their child's role as
parent of their grandchild and assert their child's parental right to have the
grandchild visit them." This legal fiction protects the right of child rearing
because it is a parent against parent conflict rather than a parent against
grandparent conflict. The difference may allow grandparent visitation in
divided families to survive strict scrutiny or receive a lower standard of
review. However, in those instances where the family is intact strict scrutiny
analysis should be applied and the statute struck down as unconstitutional.
181. See supra note 11.
182. It is clear that only relatively recently did the courts begin to allow
grandparents to overcome the objection of parents to visitation. SeeMimkon, 332 A.2d
at 201 (citing Veazey v. Stewart, 472 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Ark. 1971)); Odell v. Lutz,
177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152
(La. 1894); Nollv. Noll, 98 N.Y.S.2d 938, 941 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950); Kayv. Kay,
112 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953); Commonwealth ex rel McDonald v.
Smith, 85 A.2d 686, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952); Green v. Green, 485 S.W.2d 941, 941
(rex. Ct. App. 1972)).
183. See, e.g., Hollingsworthv. Hollingsworth, 516 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (Ohio Ct.
App 1986). Cf. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 368 S.E.2d 14, 18-19 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)
(distinguishing betweenvisitationby grandparent where child adopted by strangers and
where child adopted by relative of child or stepparent).
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GRANDPARENT VISITA TON RIGHTS
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the "child is not a mere creature of the state,""' whether a
child should visit his or her grandparents should be a decision for the parents
of that child. State legislatures should not suppose that the court system can,
or should, make better decisions than the parents of the child regarding
grandparent visitation, regardless of the conflicts giving rise to the parents'
decision to terminate contact between the grandparents and the grandchild.
Instead, the state should intervene only when a parental decision threatens the
health or safety of the child or threatens to produce a severe negative impact
on society.
MARK MOODY
184. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
1995]
25
Moody: Moody: Constitutional Questions Regarding Grandparent
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/9
